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BYRN AND ROE: THE
THRESHOLD QUESTION
AND JURIDICAL REVIEW
PETER J. RIGA*
INTRODUCTION
The essence of the right to privacy, which the Supreme Court made
the cornerstone of its decision overturning state anti-abortion statutes, Roe
v. Wade,I is stated by the maxim of J.S. Mill: "[T]he only purpose for
which [state] power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community . . . is to prevent harm to others."2 Writing for the
Roe majority, Justice Blackmun cited every case supportive of this
"unarticulated notion of a constitutional right to privacy."' This right
protects the possession of obscene materials in the privacy of one's own
home;4 the right of parents to send their children to private schools;' and,
by the Supreme Court's ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut,' the use of
contraceptives by married couples. The Griswold holding was viewed by
the Court as necessary to preserve marital privacy, a right so firmly estab-
lished in the "rooted traditions" of our people.7 This rationale, however,
was also cited as support for protection of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'
where the Court held that an unmarried person also had a constitutional
right to use contraceptives. The Court in the latter case saw the non
sequitur9 but never noted where in the Constitution it found such a right.
The rationale of Griswold was at least logical, even if unarticulated in the
Constitution, since marriage as a value was much older than the Constitu-
tion itself. Such reasoning does not apply to Eisenstadt, however, since a
right to privacy among unmarried couples never existed in the "rooted
traditions" of our people. As Justice Brennan stated: "If the right of pri-
* Ph.L., 1954, M.A., 1960, Louvain University, Belgium; M.S., 1961, Catholic University of
America; M.A., 1965, State University of New York at Buffalo; Ph.D., 1973 Graduate Theo-
logical Union, Berkeley, California; J.D., 1976 University of San Francisco.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
J. Miu., On Liberty 13 (1956).
Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT.
REv. 159, 168 [hereinafter cited as Epstein].
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
* 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See id. at 486.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453-54.
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vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."' 0 The tracings of constitutional theory have gone from the obscure
but logical in Griswold to the unintelligible and illogical in Eisenstadt.
In Roe, the privacy rationale was again relied upon by the Court in
establishing the right to terminate pregnancy before the twelfth week.
Although both Eisenstadt and Roe were based on the right to privacy, the
principled foundations of these rights were shaky at best." More particu-
larly, the Eisenstadt holding made no principled distinction between the
married and the unmarried," while the Roe Court failed to consider the
fundamental issue concerning the humanness of the unborn fetus. It is
with this first problem in Roe that the following pages are concerned.
RATIONALE OF ROE
The Roe majority studiously avoided the basic and threshold question
of every abortion decision with the bland declaration that the Court "need
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins,"'" and thus failed to
reach the difficult question of constitutional law itself. Only after the
Court answers this question, however well, can it begin to "balance" re-
spective rights of the woman, the state, and the unborn child. By not
answering the basic question, "is the unborn fetus human?," can there be
any intelligent and constitutionally principled answer to the question of
abortion? Refusal to answer this crucial fact question rendered the Roe
decision nothing more than the social and political philosophy of seven
judges.
Three months before Roe was decided, a fully argued case presented
the Court with an opportunity to decide this precise issue, which the Court
refused to consider for want of a substantial federal question.' In Byrn v.
New York City Health & Hospital Corporation,5 the appellant, an ap-
pointed guardian ad litem for certain unborn children, and all other chil-
dren similarly situated, argued before the Court that the unborn were
human beings, protected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The threshold question of the personhood and humanity of
the unborn fetus was fully argued, briefed, and presented to the Court by
I'.Id. at 453 (italics in original).
1 In Eisenstadt, Chief Justice Burger found this right to have "tenuous moorings to the text
of the Constitution." 405 U.S. at 472 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
" The problem was apparent in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). In the two
abortion decisions, no distinction was made between the unmarried Roe and the married Doe.
Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973), with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973).
See Noonan, The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. Ray. 255, 260 (1973).
13 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, 159 (1973).
" 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
15 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1972).
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the appellant in Byrn. 6 Moreover, the New York courts below had ad-
dressed the question and found that the unborn was in fact "a live human
being; '" 7 that it was "a child [with] a separate life;" 8 and that it was "a
human" who is "unquestionably alive" with "autonomy of development
and character."19
Because Roe depended heavily on the historical background of the
abortion question in reaching its decision, 2 the Byrn case is also important
from an historical point of view. Reliance on historical development is
somewhat misplaced, however, since treatment of the abortion issue varied
significantly from age to age, culture to culture, and religion to religion.
There is no agreement as to the meaning of the unborn among the many
religions, philosophies, theologies, histories, and anthropologies. Lack of
consensus,, however, does not permit the Court to unilaterally decide the
issue without resolving the precise question on which any abortion decision
turns: the rights, meaning, personhood and humanity, if any, of the un-
born.
From an historical point of view are the factual errors of the Court
itself most apparent. It is well known that lawyers and judges are bad
historians, but, when such importance is placed on an historical perspec-
tive for grave consequences to possible human beings, at the least, it is
incumbent on the Court to recite more than "law office" history. Byrn
briefed the Court on precisely those historical cases cited as examples of
anti-abortion legislation of the nineteenth century which permitted abor-
tion only to protect the pregnant woman. The Court found that "[tihe
few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the
woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus."' 2' Justice
Blackmun cited State v. Murphy22 for this proposition, although this case
was explicitly overruled in 1881 on this precise point which supported Roe's
historical generalization. In State v. Gedicke, 2 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that, contrary to Murphy, the New Jersey statute was designed
"to protect the life of the child also, and inflict the same punishment, in
case of its death, as if the mother should die. '24 The Byrn brief advised
the Court of eleven other state decisions in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries which explicitly and unambiguously stated that protection of the
Id.
Queens County Supreme Court, Jurisdictional Statement at 68a.
38 App. Div. 2d at 324, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
31 N.Y.2d 194, 199, 286 N.E.2d 887, 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972).
See 410 U.S. at 129-52. The lengthy historical excursus recounted by the Roe Court was
unnecessary, however, since there was really no constitutional principle controlling the
Court's ultimate decision-to divide pregnancy into three parts, each subject to its own consti-
tutional rules.
21 410 U.S. at 151.
2 27 N.J.L. 112 (1858), cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 n.48 (1973).
- 43 N.J.L. 86 (1881).
21 Id. at 90.
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life of an unborn child was at least one of the purposes of the respective
state's abortion laws." The Court was also advised of nine other state
decisions where this protection was implied. 21
It is true, of course, that the historical dimension of a legal problem
does not settle eo ipso a similar problem today. In this respect Justice
Brennan correctly observed that "an awareness of history and an apprecia-
tion of the aims of the Founding Fathers do not always resolve concrete
problems.""1 It would be anachronistic to expect nineteenth century deci-
sions to answer a quesion which was never encountered until the twentieth
century.28 When a claim is made on history, however, it ought to be repro-
duced accurately, lest the Justices leave the telltale trace of a forced read-
ing to reach an already determined result. That Byrn fully briefed the
Court on this precise matter only three months prior to Roe adds fuel to
the suspicion of juridical arbitrariness.
The Roe decision has presented some difficult questions for the Court
causing an ongoing debate both in the courts and among commentators. 9
Most commentators have simply lined up behind the decision of the Court
without struggling with the profound analytical problems of the decision
itself. The threshold question concerning the nature and interests of the
unborn fetus is never answered, leaving it to philosophers and theologians
to debate. Philosophers and theologians do not have the power to decide
this question however, either in practice or in theory for all persons, in
particular for those who stand to lose their very existence. This is why it
is crucial to return to that basic question, as did the lower and appellate
courts of New York, 0 if we are to give the abortion decisions any rational,
legal standard and constitutional principle.
" The eleven decisions cited were: Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 73 So. 834 (1916);
Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514 (1872); Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934);
State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75
(1913); Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 216, 54 P.2d 666 (1936); State v. Ausplund, 86 Or.
121, 167 P. 1019 (1917), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 563 (1919); State v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380
(1859); State v. Fox, 197 Wash. 67, 84 P.2d 357 (1938).
"6 Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128 (1868); Smith v.
State, 33 Me. 48 (1851); Worthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 48 A. 355 (1901); People v.
Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 26 N.W. 291 (1886); Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 112 N.W. 611
(1907); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 N.E.2d 108 (1958); Mills v. Commonwealth,
13 Pa. 631 (1850); State v. Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091 (1898).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As one author stated: "IThe application of precedent, legal continuity, and balanced
contemporary socio-political theory is almost certain to produce a more intelligent result than
is the attempt to use a few scattered historical documents as though they possessed the
qualities of Holy Writ." Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV.
119, 156-57.
3 The most recent variation of Roe is the Court's decision that neither the federal government
nor the individual states have a constitutional obligation to fund "nontherapeutic" abortions.
See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977).
10 See notes 17-19 supra.
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As previously noted, the threshold question, which the Supreme Court
refused in theory to factually resolve, concerns both the nature and rights
of the unborn fetus.3' A woman's right of privacy invoked as the justifica-
tion of abortion would be a proper ground if all that were involved were
the femme sole. This reasoning, however constitutionally inarticulate, be-
comes improper when the precise threshold question raised involves the
social limits necessarily placed on the individual. In this case, the social
relationship between the born and the "person" or "being" of the unborn
must first be resolved.
In many areas of the law, the unborn are treated as persons. Tort law,3"
criminal law,3 and property law3 4 have treated the unborn as persons for
many purposes, and recent decisions have tended to expand, not limit,
these rights. It is therefore logical to ask why the law should treat the
unborn as persons in these contexts while adopting a different position in
abortion cases. Some reasoned principles of constitutional law must be
brought forth to reconcile these disparities in the law. To develop a novel
constitutional right of a woman's privacy without addressing the question
concerning the personhood or humanity of the unborn fetus does not suffi-
ciently justify the Roe holding. If there is no historical, legal, philosophical,
or theological consensus on the answer to this question, it becomes difficult
to invoke reasoned constitutional principles in a doctrine of juridical re-
view. It is common knowledge that a decision of the Court is as strong as
the reasoned principles supporting that decision; otherwise the Court is
imposing a solution in function of its own political preferences, a practice
described by one commentator as "lochnerizing." 3 In other words, if this
basic threshold question is not or cannot be answered by the Court, it
imposes its solution through "raw juridical power." If the Court admitted
ignorance in this area, which it did,3" then it had no business deciding the
case and should have left the question to those better able to balance the
equities and respond to the will of the people, i.e., the legislatures. The
Court of Appeals of New York demonstrated this ability by answering the
basic question, then leaving it to the legislature to determine what rights
it would grant to the unborn.37 The Court of Appeals in Byrn found that
constitutionally, the unborn were not "persons" since "what is a legal
person is for the law, including, of course, the Constitution, to say, which
3' See note 2 supra.
32 See W. PROSSMR, THE LAW OF ToRrs § 337 (4th ed. 1971).
See R. PERKINS, CIMINAL LAW xiii (1969).
U See J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUrTIES 931-47 (1886).
Ely explains "lochnerizing" as the Supreme Court's manufacture of a constitutional right
to superimpose its own view of wise social policy on those of the legislatures. See Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935 (1973). Justice
Stewart's concurrence admits as much, saying that it is impossible to regard Roe as the
product of anything else. 410 U.S. 113, 167 (Stewart, J., concurring).
N 410 U.S. at 159.
31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
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simply means that upon according legal personality to a thing the law
affords it the rights and privileges of a legal person.""' Although this rea-
soning recalls the menacing Dred Scott decision, at least it was logical
and left the question to the legislature to resolve. 9 Scott also imposed a
view of partial personhood, that is, for all practical purposes, of nonperson-
hood, very similar to what Roe did but with infinitely less historical pre-
cedent.
If it is determined that the unborn are human beings/persons,1" then
the reasoning of Roe becomes pointless. Blackmun's list of ration-
ales-"distressful life and future" of the woman; psychological harm; the
taxing of mental and physical health; distress caused by an unwanted
child; the stigma of unwed motherhood-becomes irrelevant." If the un-
born are not human beings/persons, then no reasons need be given by any
woman to justify abortion since her right is one of pure privacy in the
, Id. at 196, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
Id. at 202, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 394. Perhaps it is the jurisprudence of the
New York Court of Appeals which most closely resembles Scott: "What is a legal person is
for the law, including, of course, the Constitution, to say, which simply means that upon
according legal personality to a thing the law affords it the rights and privileges of a legal
person." Id. at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393. Simply put, this is a jurisprud-
ence which finds the source of human rights in the State-a favorite locus of totalitarianism
of this century. The dissent quite properly pointed this out:
Again the Appellate Division adopted the theory that the State is supreme and free to
degrade the inalienable rights of human beings which were not given to them by the
State and cannot be diminished nor taken away by the State. The Appellate Division
and the majority agree that the "state," as in Nazi Germany, could decide what human
beings are persons or nonpersons.
Id. at 211, 286 N.E.2d at 895, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (Burke, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
in 'Roe had no occasion to address itself to this question for the simple reason that it never
decided the central question whether the unborn are human beings and if they are, for what
reason they are excluded from the protection of their lives by the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court simply presumed that the unborn are not legal persons
because the framers of the Constitution and of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to
include the unborn in its protection. The theory that the state is the origin of all human rights
is, therefore, not part of the jurisprudence of Roe. It does surface, however, in Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), also involving abortion rights. In
rejecting the absolute need for spousal permission for an abortion, the Court comes close to
adopting Kelsian jurisprudence, see H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 93-109
(1946), by stating:
We thus agree. . . that the State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the
state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy . . . .' Clearly, since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion
during the first stage, then the physician and his patient make that decision, the State
cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abor-
tions during the same period.
. . . This is to misplace the source of this right of privacy older than our Bill of Rights,
older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486 (citation omitted).
40 For a discussion of this distinction, see notes 69-77 infra.
410 U.S. at 153.
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autonomy of her own body. In the former case, one must somehow justify
the killing of an innocent human being and balance that against the inter-
ests of the woman; in the latter case, however, no more is involved than in
removing tonsils or having a face lift. The act becomes no one's business
but that of the woman alone since she harms no one and benefits herself.
The criteria used by the courts to determine the personhood-
nonpersonhood of the fetus include wantedness, birth, and viability. If we
choose one of these, what is the reasoned constitutional principle justifying
such a choice? Blackmun chose an intermediate ground for this determina-
tion; he refused to choose and in refusing, he chose. He examined every
place in the Constitution where the word "person" appears and concluded
that whether the term was meant to include the unborn is unclear.2 In the
words of the noted commentator Epstein:
The Justice simply cannot strike a balance for the first trimester of preg-
nancy unless he has some theory of life of his own which shows that there is
no "compelling" interest of the unborn child. His exhaustive history of the
abortion question indicates quite clearly that there is no consensus on the
question, and it is simple fiat and power that gives his position its legal
effect.' 3
In other words, the Court struck down the legislative enactments on abor-
tion of all fifty states, which attempted for the most part to balance these
delicate and volatile interests in the interest of privacy; 4 but it avoided
the truly hard question on which every abortion case-even where the life
of the mother is in danger-must necessarily turn. Since Byrn v. New York
City Health & Hospital Corporation faced this question squarely it would
be valuable to study the arguments in that case and apply them to Roe v.
Wade as a possibility for future judicial review. In re-examining the ration-
ale of Byrn, perhaps the Court can retrace its steps and correct a very bad
constitutional decision. 5
THRESHOLD AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION
Failure to answer the question of who or what is the unborn child is
failure of judicial review itself. Are the unborn human beings? If they are,
why are they not persons under the Constitution? Is there any real distinc-
tion between human being and legal person, and if so, in what rational
distinction does it lie? Is it enough for the Court to claim legal nonperson-
42 Id. at 157.
'3 Epstein, supra note 3, at 182.
410 U.S. 949 (1973).
Roe v. Wade is symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible in constitutional
litigation. Even in cases that do not give rise to the devilish questions of what counts
as a person, the term "compelling state interest" is an analytical snare of no modest
proportions. But here, where the question is not "how much" but "whose," the phrase
is but a plaything of the judges, an excuse but never a reason for a decision.
Epstein, supra note 3, at 165.
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hood and decide the question by nondecision, thereby deciding? Is there
more in the Constitution's notion of "person" than mere legal concept or
even citizenship? Some answers to these difficult questions must be given
if the issue of abortion is to be decided rationally by constitutional princi-
ple. If this question is not resolved, the unborn simply have no interests
to weigh against those of the woman and of the state. By the same token,
the real as well as hard question of the abortion cases is never answered.
The Court divided pregnancy into three trimesters." In the first
trimester the decision to abort rests exclusively with the woman in consult-
ation with her doctor; 47 near the beginning of the second trimester, the
state's interest in the health and well being of the woman comes into being
such that legislation can be passed promoting the health of the woman; in
the third trimester, the interest of the state-particularly after viability of
the fetus-in protecting "potential life" is compelling enough for the state
to forbid all abortions except when necessary to save the life or health of
the mother.4 8 It should be carefully noted that the balance of interests,
when balancing is necessary, occurs between the mother and the state. The
basic question of the unborn's right to life is simply never considered and
so no balance here is even attempted. In other words, the order of ques-
tions which the Court asks runs as follows:
1) Does the right of privacy include the right to abort?
2) Is the unborn child a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment?
The factual and hard question whether an abortion kills a live human
being remains unresolved under this analysis.
For reasoned constitutional principles, the following should have been
the logic of questions posed and answered:
1) Is the unborn child, as a matter of fact for the Court to decide, a live
human being?
2) Are all human beings "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment?
3) In the light of the answers to these first two questions, has the state a
compelling interest in the protection of the unborn child through and by the
fourteenth amendment?
One must always return to this threshold question for a logical, consistent,
and rational analysis of the abortion question. This is the substance of
constitutional law. Without this approach, nothing is answered. Instead,
what the Court does is "lochnerize" by imposing, as law, its own social and
political philosophy.
The Court discussed "potential" human life49 in trying to escape the
hard factual question. In the very term itself lies a basic assumption, never
410 U.S. at 162.
Id. at 163.
48 Id.
11 410 U.S. at 150.
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clearly articulated, that what we are dealing with is something less than
human. This is a strange analytical concept, since the English word
"potential" connotes a potency or possibility from what is not yet to the
possibility of being. It is not as yet, but it can be in the future. Thus, by
describing unborn life as potential, and therefore, less than human, the
Roe decision does not cause the destruction of a present hic et nunc human
being. This reasoning begs the very question which the Court has not
answered but implicitly decided by permitting the destruction of the un-
born. The unborn child is afforded no protection until "actual" life begins
at birth.50 It is only then that the life of the unborn becomes "meaning-
ful,'' 5I a description which amounts to little more than a value term.52
The Court described its view-that the unborn possesses actual life as
human persons-as "rigid", "3 but never explained who this is so.
This discussion inevitably returns to the threshold question, which the
Court purportedly refused to answer: When does life begin? The fact of the
matter is that no one doubts when human life begins." Sophisticated
knowledge of biology has made it simply impossible to deny that biologi-
cal, human life exists from the time of conception:
[Tihe result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact, which every-
one really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous
whether intra or extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic
gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking
a human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially
impeccable auspices. 5
'o Id. at 164-65.
" Id. at 163.
See note 92 infra.
See 410 U.S. at 156-57.
" See notes 55-60 infra.
5 CALIFORNIA MEDICINE, September, 1970, at 68. This same issue attains to other areas as well,
for example, the question of human fetal experimentation. If one is dealing with a human
being, the moral question cannot be avoided by an invocation of a legal definition of the
unborn. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORIAL RESEARCH (1975). An attempt to grapple with the basic moral
question becomes an almost impossible task after Roe v. Wade. See Steinfels, The National
Commission and Fetal Research, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (1975). The confusion was evi-
denced in the conclusoryrecommendations of the Commission's report, see id. at 6, 73-74,
77. This has led some commentators to opine that the restrictions of the National Commission
and later federal regulations of 1975, patterned on the National Commission's report, 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1977), were therefore unconstitutional:
If it is the thesis of this Article that the question of fetal personhood cannot be resolved
through rational inquiry but is a matter of faith and of religious belief. Moreover, in
this society, it is a belief as to which there clearly is no consensus. The federal regula-
tions governing fetal research give official sanction to the disputed premise of fetal
personhood and thereby force nonbelievers to conform their behavior to it.
Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An Establishment Clause
Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REv. 961, 1004 (1977). The permissible secular purposes of such restric-
tions, the brutalizing effect on society and the undermining of a woman's ability to change
her mind are not sufficient to uphold the regulations. Id. The difficulty here, as in Roe, is
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The Byrn brief cited extensive evidence of the biological similarities
between the born and the unborn, which was contradicted neither by the
courts below nor by the State of New York, in its own brief and motion to
dismiss, and concluded: 5 "[T]o say that the unborn is not a 'fully
fledged' human being or that he is something less than a live human child
with a separate existence is to make a judgment based, not on factual
secular criteria, but on unsupported, acculturated preconceptions."57 This
conclusory statement is noted not because it proves what it says-the
accumulated evidence and expert testimony was quite impressive-but
only to show that the Supreme Court chose to ignore what biology has
indisputably demonstrated and which all the courts below, along with the
appellees, accepted as true. In a constitutional scheme which seeks to
balance various interests, it is astounding, to say the least, that this
massive amount of evidence in support of the humanity and rights of
the unborn was simply ignored.
58
Instead, the Court ipso dixit resorted to a concept of "potential human
life" to define the existence of the unborn and concluded that such a life
must either be "meaningful" or at least born before the state can protect
it."' Any discussion of the rights of the unborn is omitted and the Court
arbitrarily makes "viability" the point at which the state's interest be-
comes sufficiently strong to enable the state to protect a potential life.60
Even this is not certain since the state may-but is not constitutionally
compelled-to protect such life. Such protection, moreover, even if in-
voked, is itself illusory since it may be set aside when the health or life of
the mother is in danger."' In any case, the balancing conducted by the
Court was solely between the mother and the state and never between the
mother and her unborn child.
In Byrn, the Court was presented with a massive amount of biological-
empirical evidence which it chose to ignore, or at least not to examine.
Theoretically, the Court itself must decide the issue based upon the factual
situation presented. In other words, the Court has a duty to examine the
that even if, arguendo, we are dealing with problematic personhood, the legal doubt should
always be in favor of human personhood and that Roe is bad constitutional law for not having
decided this threshold and basic question concerning the humanity of the unborn. The ques-
tion is legally undecided, and consequently, the federal regulations can be fully justified as
favoring not religion but simple tutiorism, resolving the basic doubt in this way. If the Su-
preme Court were to decide that, irrespective of whether the unborn are factual human
beings, they must be treated as legal nonpersons, then we may examine the motives of the
federal regulations. Until that time, the question has not been resolved and the regulations
are on firm secular grounds for taking the safer, more stringent grounds.
, See Brief for appellant at 10-19, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d
194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), enumerating 18 basic similarities.
'T Id. at 17.
See 410 U.S. at 162.
n' Id. at 163.
a Id.
' Id. at 163-64.
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facts concerning the humanity of the unborn. Legislatures will also balance
opposing interests in delicate situations, but it is within the province of
judicial review to examine the situation anew and to make a concrete
determination concerning the matter at hand; otherwise, the Court should
not decide the case at all.62 If it does decide without resolving the factual
issues raised, it does so as a function of its power, and not through analyti-
cal and reasoned constitutional principles. In its refusal to investigate the
facts as presented in Byrn and decide them, the Roe Court incorrectly
formulated constitutional law because it neither asked nor solved the basic
and hard question surrounding abortion cases-does abortion as a matter
of fact kill a live human being?-since this is the fact upon which the
constitutional issues rest. 3 The Court escaped the problem by declining to
pass on the factual issue of the humanity/personhood of the unborn."4 More
to the point, the Court refused to pass judgment on the lives of these
human beings on the ground that they failed to meet certain legal stan-
dards, which are the very part of the litigation itself, while at the same
time, the Court omitted even the mention of these legal standards. Both
the New York courts and the Supreme Court failed to establish the legal
standards for a human being-the heart of the abortion cases.
The New York Court of Appeals claimed that it was for the legislature,
limited by the Constitution, to determine who is a legal person. 5 The
Court, however, never explained what those limits actually are. Instead,
the court of appeals found that the unborn have "the potential to become
full-fledged human beings." 6 Does this mean that before that time, when-
ever it is, they are less than human and, therefore, can be killed as an
undesired mole or wart; or, does this mean that for legal purposes, the law
may treat them as less than human? This uncertainty begs the precise
issue at stake, the question which cannot be escaped if the abortion deci-
sion is to be rationally, analytically, and constitutionally sound.
This reasoning is too reminiscent of the Dred Scott" rationale to
justify the Court's avoidance of the hard question by responding with a
purely "legal" solution. This analysis is also suggestive of the text of the
original Constitution6 where slaves were counted as three-fifths of free
persons. There, too, a legal fiction was devised, resulting in the conclusion
that slaves were not "full-fledged" human beings. It is well-known that
such legal fiction is subterfuge from the basic obligation of any court of law
in its refusal to resolve the basic issue in dispute. What is a full person?
62 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959).
63 See Motion to Postpone Jurisdiction at 7, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp.,
31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
', Id. at 6.
*s Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 201, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889,
335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (1972).
6 Id. at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
'7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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What is a partial person? These are the hard questions for judicial determi-
nation which neither the courts below nor the Supreme Court faced.
HUMAN BEINGNESS-PERSONHOOD
There can be no escape from the threshold question. Either it is re-
solved and the issue clearly defined and thus disposed of, or we make
pretense that we have not resolved the question at all, while, simultane-
ously, our actions betray our words. This is why the issue must be con-
fronted head-on, a task Byrn did and Roe refused to undertake.
In reaching its ultimate decision the Roe Court continuously applied
the terms "partial person," "full-fledged human being," "potential life,"
and "meaningful life." There is no scientific body of opinion, however,
which could sustain such terminology.e° These are legal fictions of the first
order devised by the Court as psychological rationalizations for taking the
life of human beings. Otherwise, they are not needed at all, since what is
killed is not considered human, and the right to abort is thus deemed the
exclusive prerogative of the woman who is free to do with her body what
she wishes. 0 The Court, of course, circumvented the problem by the ipso
dixit that actual human life-or meaningful human life-does not begin
until live birth. The real issue before the Court was whether the Constitu-
tion forbids state protection of individuals found to be human beings.7' The
Court itself observed this same type of reasoning when in a previous case
it stated: "[T]o say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal'
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal
Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such
'legal' lines as it chooses."72 In still another case the standard announced
for determining the existence of human beings protected under the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment was stated: "They are
humans, live and have their being. ' "I If the Court is determined to draw a
distinction between born and unborn and classifies the latter as "partial"
person~iood,11 or "potential" life,75 then we must ask, by what rational
standard, consistent with constitutional adjudication, is such a line
drawn.76 Such a rational standard is critical in the abortion cases.
" See WEIss, PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT: A TEXTBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL EMBRYOLOGY (1939);
WINDLE, PHYSIOLOGY OF THE FETus (1971).
7 Riga, On the Ethics of Lawyers, 22 CATH. LAw. 305 (1976).
7' This is clear from the fact that in Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas statute which
protected the unborn. See Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971),
vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (inconsistent with Roe); notes 104-120 infra.
"' Glona v. American Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
13 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
" Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d
390 (1972).
7 410 U.S. at 162.
7, See Brief for appellant at 33-34, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d
194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
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A distinction between born and unborn is utterly irrational by mod-
ern, secular, biological-medical standards since the only distinction be-
tween an eight-week-old fetus, and eight-day-born child and an eighty-
year-old man, is simply one of age, and age has never been seen as a
rational basis or standard for determining who and what is a human being.
There is no qualitative difference--biologically and scientifically-which
could colorably support a "legal" line whereby one is a fourteenth amend-
ment person protected by the Equal Protection Clause and the other is
simply a nonperson. It is just as irrational to base such a fundamental
distinction on age as it is on race, where, as shown in Brown v. Board of
Education," there is no scientifically provable distinction between the
races: "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected."7"
Since science and sociology were very influential in this determination
in Brown, why, one may ask, is not science equally as influential in Roe?
The only rational difference between the above-mentioned persons is de-
velopmental, which does not amount to qualitative difference as regard to
humanness. Byrn exhaustively showed every aspect of this development
and comparison in the brief presented before the Court.7
What other criteria can be given for establishing some rational stan-
dard for determining the humanity/nonhumanity of the unborn? Many
lower courts imposed standards having no relationship to the threshold
question in the abortion: the humanity/nonpersonhood of the unborn. In
1860, for instance, a Connecticut statute was amended to delete the quick-
ening distinction in its abortion law to afford stronger protection of unborn
life. s° This amended statute was declared unconstitutional even though it
T 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In this respect, note the parallel form of reasoning in the following:
It [the Equal Protection Clause] does not require the states to treat all persons
identically; the states may base their laws upon reasonable legislative classifications,
which differentiate between people or groups in different circumstances. Legislative
classification based upon race or color is, however, lacking in the rational basis that is
necessary for such classification to be sustained. Even if we concede that there may
be differences between the races can we say that we know enough, scientifically
speaking, about racial differences to conclude that classification based on race is other
than irrational? If we are frank, we must admit that racial classification reflects not
objective science, but racial animosity. If the equal protection clause means what it
says, such irrational classification cannot mount the hurdle of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
B. SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 265 (1965) (emphasis added).
7' 347 U.S. at 494-95.
, See note 63 supra.
CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16 (1821), amended by Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 71, § 1 (1860);
CONN. GEN STAT. § 53-30 (1977), held unconstitutional, Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800
(D. Conn. 1972), re-enacted Conn. Pub. Acts. ch. 71, § 1, CONN. GzN. STAT. § 53-30 (1972)
(declaring specifically a legislative intent to protect the unborn), held unconstitutional, Abele
v.'Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
23 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1978
was clearly the legislative intent to protect unborn life. This was declared
"insufficient" by a lower federal court in Abele v. Markle which then
stated its own criteria of what is permissible for abortion:
The Malthusian specter, only a dim shadow in the past, has caused grave
concern in recent years as the world's population has increased beyond all
previous estimates. Unimpeachable studies [referring to the report of the
Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future]
have indicated the importance of slowing or halting population growth ...
In short, population growth must be restricted, not enhanced, and thus the
state interest in pronatalist statutes such as these is limited."'
What is remarkable here is that the ratio decidendi had absolutely nothing
to do with the humanity or nonhumanity of the unborn. It was premised
on the purely extraneous consideration of overpopulation. 8 In other words,
notwithstanding the focus of Connecticut's nineteenth century abortion
law upon preservation of prenatal life, and in spite of the fact that it was
reenacted in 1972, clearly intended as a protection of the life of the unborn,
the law was declared unconstitutional since, "because of the population
crisis, . . . the state interest in these statutes is less than when they were
passed."
The Abele court's reasoning is clearly irrelevant to the central issue
of the abortion cases. If the fetus is a human being then he must be
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment," and his interests in life must be clearly balanced against any right
to privacy of the mother. More logical was the response of the district court
in Babbitz v. McCann5 which invalidated an abortion statute designed to
protect the unborn "from the time of conception": [T]he mother's inter-
ests are superior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo
is mere protoplasm, as the plaintiff contends, or a human being, as the
Wisconsin statute declares."" In addition to quaint and historically mis-
leading language such as "unquickened embryo," the only balance at-
tempted by the court was its ipso dixit that the mother's interests are
superior, even if the unborn are human beings. No effort or balance was
made by the court to determine the constitutional status of the unborn
because, according to the court, this question was irrelevant; it had already
determined that even if the unborn are human beings, this would be an
" Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. at 803.
" This theme was followed in another abortion case where the Court stated: "Such concerns
(population growth] are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could
constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality between abortion
and childbirth." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 n.11 (1977). It should be noted that the
Court here is speaking about the funding of abortions (therapeutic and nontherapeutic)
whereas Markle addressed the reasons why a woman may have an abortion.
' Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. at 804.
u See notes 104-110 infra.
M 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
" 310 F. Supp. at 301.
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insufficient reason to overcome the interests of the mother in a right to
abort.
Adopting a position similar to that of Roe, the Babbitz court refused
to address the essential question of fact. We are told nothing of the social
limits to be placed upon the mother's choice except that, seemingly, there
are none. If the unborn are human beings, moreover, why is it that the
protection of life guranteed by the fourteenth amendment does not apply
to them? For the decision to make judicial sense, however, there must be
some principled application of a constitutional standard. This is, after all,
why there exist courts of law and not for law. The role of the court is always
jus dicere not jus dare; and if a court makes law when it applies law to
novel or changed circumstances, it must do so by reasoned and analytical
constitutional principles for juridical review. "In the case of the Supreme
Court only principled grounds for decision stand between it and the charge
of arbitrary decision based upon its naked political preferences. '87
The questions raised and decided in Markle and Babbitz were insuffi-
cient to establish a sound constitutional standard to be followed when the
legality of abortion is at issue. If the unborn are not human or human
beings, there would be no problem to resolve; if they are humans, however,
the court must undertake a serious balancing of rights for any reasoned and
principled constitutional determination. In order to render its decision
constitutionally and rationally sound, the Babbitz court was required to
formulate its rationale by applying established constitutional principles to
either one of these two positions. The killing of innocent human beings
must somehow be resolved and not simply glossed over by the terms of
legal subterfuge such as "potential" life, "meaningful" life, "full-fledged"
human being, overpopulation preoccupation, etc. The main criticism
against using such invocations is that they are not legal standards at all,
let alone rational, but catch-words for social policy making. By employing
such terms, the courts "lochnerize" a result they have already predeter-
mined.
The Court in Roe attempted to justify its analysis by citing other
criteria as legal standards:
" Epstein, supra note 3, at 175-76. In the vigorous dissents of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
482 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, J.J., dissenting), this factor clearly separated
them from the majority. As Justice Powell stated in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977):
Our dissenting Brothers, . . . express in vivid terms their anguish over the perceived
impact of today's decision on indigent pregnant women who prefer abortion to carrying
the fetus to childbirth. We think our Brothers misconceive the issues before us, as well
as the role of the judiciary.
* * ' But we leave entirely free both the Federal Government and the States,
through the normal processes of democracy, to provide the desired funding. The issues
present policy decisions of the widest concern. They should be resolved by the repre-
sentatives of the people, not by this Court.
Id. at 447 n.15 (citations omitted).
23 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1978
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medi-
cally diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be immiment. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved. All these factors the woman and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation."
It is uncertain whether this check list is cited as individual criteria or as
cumulative. As previously discussed, the events of "quickening,"
"viability," and "birth" are irrational criteria for the simple reason that
there is no scientific reason for accepting such distinctions. From a biologi-
cal point of view, these terms amount to mere fictions having no recognized
scientific foundation, except perhaps psychological. If the event of birth is
the criterion, then one is faced with the indisputable fact that there is no
qualitative difference between the born and the unborn. This error be-
comes clear in A bele v. Markle, " where, speaking of an abortion which was
unsuccessful because it resulted in a live birth, the court stated: "If a
statute protected the lives of all fetuses born alive, it would be protecting
persons entitled to Fourteenth Amendment rights."9 Thus, if the fetus
remains in the womb the fetus is not a fourteenth amendment person
entitled to protection under law; but, if such fetus is untimely removed
from the womb and is alive, fourteenth amendment personhood is immedi-
ately conferred. From a constitutional point of view this surely touches
upon the realm of the irrational and unprincipled. The fetus is no less
alive, no less human, before, as well as after, an abortion which results in
a live birth. "How can it seriously be claimed as a matter of constitutional
law that an unsuccessful attempt to kill a live human being acts as a
vehicle for conferring Fourteenth Amendment personhood upon him which
he would not possess if the attempt to kill him had not occurred?"'"
The concepts of "viability" and "quickening," moreover, have their
own particular problems which, in the final analysis, prove nothing and
become similarly arbitrary. Justice Blackmun found "viability" control-
ling since it is at that point when the life of the unborn becomes
"meaningful" and the state's interest increases to such a point that it may
forbid abortion altogether except to save the life and health of the mother."
410 U.S. at 113.
" 351 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Conn. 1972).
' Id. at 226.
" Motion to Postpone Jurisdiction at 36, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31
N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
12 See notes 63-68 supra. The life and health exception here renders even this period of life of
the unborn nugatory.
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The concept of viability, however, has never been held legal except in tort
law and even there it has now been almost universally rejected. 3 The
concept itself is not without its own analytical difficulties. What is nonvi-
able today may be viable in a few years. While medical science increases
the possibility of survival in premature births, the logic of Roe appears to
push back this point of viability. If in a few years a fifteen week fetus shall
have become viable, "albeit with artificial aid," 5 then will that totally
external and extrinsic development confer what is intrinsic to the very
being of the fetus itself? This consequence is absurd. What is even more
disturbing is that basic constitutional standards are made to hinge on such
irrationality. If a legislature had made such a determination, one could
always excuse it as a basically political decision in a representative democ-
racy, and it would be left to the people to determine the rightness or
wrongness of such a social policy. Judicial review is radically different,
however. It proceeds and has force by its reasoned and principled constitu-
tional elaboration-which is totally absent from the concept of "viability."
The element of "quickening" is even more analytically and histori-
cally troublesome." This concept was introduced in law in the eighteenth
century only as a crude method of determining proof in an abortion prose-
cution that the abortional act had been an assault on a live human being
and the cause of its death. Historical studies reveal the following law on
abortion at the end of the seventeenth century:
1) An abortion of a woman "quick with child" resulting in a live birth and
subsequent death of the child was "murder" 7 or a "great crime,"'" and the
proof of life and casuality was clear ab initio;
2) An abortion of a woman "quick with child" resulting in a stillbirth was
a "great misprision" because there was no proof that the abortional act itself
caused the death of the child;"
3) An abortion of a pregnant woman, at any stage of pregnancy, which
resulted in her death, was felony murder;'"
'3 See Maldeon, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,
46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 354-58 (1971).
" 410 U.S. at 160. The Court itself defined viability as "potentially, able to live outside of
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id.
IS /d.
See Historical Addendum of Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. A8-A37.
'7 COKE, TIRD INsTITum 50 (1644) [hereinafter cited as COKE]:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a Potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe;
or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a
dead childe, this is a great misprision [misdemeanor], and no murder;' but if the
childe be born alive, and dieth of the Potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder:
for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature in rerum nature, when it is born alive.
Sim's Case, [1601] K.B. 176, 75 Eng. Rep. 1075.
" COKE, note 97 supra.
1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 429-30 (1736):
But if a woman be with child, and any gives her a potion to destroy the child within
her, and she takes it, and it works so strongly, that it kills her, this is murder, for it
was not given to cure her of a disease, but unlawfully to destroy her child within her,
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4) The unborn child was "a person in rerum natura" at common law, 10'
except that problems of proof often'02 precluded such a designation in crimi-
nal abortion situations; and,
5) Abortion was considered a malum in se and was hardly viewed as a basic
"freedom" of the pregnant woman.
From an historical point of view, therefore, there is little evidence
sustaining Blackmun's abortion decision. What evidence there exists is
diametrically opposed to the conclusions of Roe. Even if, arguendo, the
common law was in fact what Roe stated it to be-and it emphatically is
not-such common law principles would still be of no consolation to the
Roe majority for the simple reason that the fundamental question had not
been addressed or answered. Too much science and biology have proved
today what the forefathers of the common law could not have guessed, so
that failure to answer the threshold question in Roe becomes even more
culpable as an exercise in constitutional decision making. "Viability" and
"quickening" are distinctions without foundation in re and the ambiguous
history of abortion will simply not suffice as a legal and constitutional
standard for abortion cases.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
There remains to be discussed the bate noir of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the question whether its authors intended to include the unborn
under its protection. It should be pointed out first and foremost that this
argument is secondary to the threshold question, as pointed out earlier.
0 3
No matter how this question is resolved-and Roe seems to place much
importance on the result' 04-it is above all a legal question as opposed to
a factual determination of the nature of the threshold question. To attach
too much importance to the fourteenth amendment when discussing the
threatened lives and existence of human beings is to cover the reality of
what the Court really did. 05 Such discussion in Roe will not and cannot
and therefore he that gives a potion to this end, must take the hazard, and if it kill
the mother, it is murder, and so ruled before me at the assizes at Bury in the year 1670.
Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 114, 115, 26 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (1740):
The principal reason I go upon the question is, that the plaintiff was in ventre sa
mere at the time of her brother's death, and consequently a person in rerum natura,
so that both by the rules of the common and civil law, she was, to all intents and
purposes, a child, as much as if both in the father's life-time.
102 See note 97 supra.
03 See notes 50-62 supra.
10 410 U.S. at 163.
"- NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW Xi-Xii (1976), stated:
Legal history, legal philosophy, and legal education, or rather, the persons who are
engaged in legal history, philosophy, and education, are or should be concerned with
law not as a set of technical skills which may be put to any use but as a human activity
... the analytic bent of most of those now so engaged leads them to reduce 'person'
to a congerie of "rights" .... Evading analytical reduction, the whole person
escapes them.
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help the Court in its dilemma of what must factually be faced and re-
solved. Even if, arguendo, the framers of the fourteenth amendment did
not intend to include the unborn, the basic question concerning the hu-
manity of the unborn remains, and this interpretation will not relieve the
Court of its fundamental duty to determine that question. Neither history
nor the supposed intent of the founding fathers helps to resolve the ques-
tion for the simple reason that such contemporary problems were not and
could not be anticipated until modern technology created the means to
obtain safe and reliable abortions. Current knowledge and science contrib-
ute to the Court's responsibility for resolving the abortion question to an
extent greater than any of the framers of the fourteenth amendment could
possibly have dreamt.
An analysis of the fourteenth amendment was the basis of the Court's
rationale in Dred Scott. 06 Justice Curtis, in a dissenting opinion, posed the
question in a manner applicable to Roe:
If it is admitted that the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what
free persons . . . shall be citizens of the United States, it must at the same
time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the
control of Congress it must certainly depend wholly upon its discretion. For
certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found in the Constitution, which
is wholly silent concerning it; . . . the necessary consequence [being] that
the Federal Government may select classes of persons. . . who alone can be
entitled [to the rights of citizenship]. 10
What might be said in defense of Scott, from an analytical point of view,
which would not apply to Roe, is that the former had a solid base in
constitutional and United States history. There were no facts or beliefs in
history similarly supportive of Roe. The Constitutional Convention itself
was replete with testimony of the common view that slaves were not whole
persons, and the final Constitution, which made a slave worth three-fifths
of a free person for purposes of representation in Congress, reflected this
belief. The Roe Court, on the other hand, was unable to point to any
constitutional interpretation of legal history of the United States which
permitted, much less required, the exclusion of the unborn from the status
of "person." Moreover, what little legal history and precedent there was,
firmly established that the nineteenth century legal history was very solic-
itous about the life of the unborn.'"8 More to the point, for the first time
since 1857, Roe introduces an interpretation of the Constitution which
excludes a whole class of biologically human beings from the enjoyment
of basic human rights.
This resemblance to Dred Scott becomes more pronounced when the
Court defined "wantedness" as one of the criteria for abortion. The argu-
ments suggest the principle of legalized slavery that a slave is not a person
10 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
"o Id. at 577-78.
,oA See notes 22-26 supra.
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but is property without civil rights until his master sets him free; at which
time, miraculo dictu, he acquires all the fundamental rights of a legal
person.'"' What a human being was not, he miraculously becomes by the
"wantedness" of another, in the case of slavery, the master. Whether a live,
human being is a legal person with a right to live and to the law's protec-
tion cannot be made to depend upon the will of another; this is not only
an arbitrariness of law in the extreme; it is utterly irrational."0 Yet, the
Court twisted the central question and focused upon those issues which can
be satisfactorily answered only after we have answered the threshold ques-
tion: is the unborn child human? Can the Court artificially separate hu-
manity from constitutional personhood without overstepping constitu-
tional limitations? The only precedent for drawing such distinctions was
the prior legality of slavery.
Whatever else may be said concerning the intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment, it is clear that, from the testimony available, they
did not intend separate constitutional guarantees for the born and the
unborn based solely on the distinctions cited by the pre-war slaveholders
to justify slavery."' The Roe Court seems to have made the precise distinc-
tion since, according to the Court, the unborn historically were not consid-
ered to be persons "in the whole sense.""' The Court treads upon ex-
tremely shaky historical grounds in making such a broad generalization.
More to the point, it is a fair and probable assumption that "life" which
is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments is human life from
conception, as all modern scientific evidence unimpeachably shows. By
what constitutional authority and reasoned principle does the Supreme
Court carve out a substantive exception to this protection to exclude
beings who are "living, human and have their being?""
3
'" See Bailey v. Poindexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. 132 (1858).
10 "The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life ... at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence
of slavery itself." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
" See Address by Congressman John Bingham at Bowerstown, Ohio, August 24, 1866,
reprinted in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Aug. 27, 1866, at 1, cols. 1, 3:
Look at that simple proposition. No state shall deny to any person, no matter whence
he comes, or how poor, how weak, how simple - no matter how friendless - no State
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. If there
be any man here who objects to a proposition so just as that, I would like him to rise
in his place and let his neighbors look at him and see what manner of man he is. (A
voice - "He isn't here, I guess.") That proposition my fellow-citizens needs no argu-
ment. No man can . . . dare to utter the proposition that of right any State in the
Union should deny to any human being who behaves himself well, the equal protection
of the laws. Paralysis ought to strangle the utterance upon the tongue before a man
should be guilty of the blasphemy of saying that he himself, to the exclusion of his
fellow man, should enjoy the protection of the laws.
12 410 U.S. at 162. It should again be noted that the Court here is speaking of legal persons
since it never addressed itself to, let alone resolve, the fundamental question of the humanity
of the unborn.
"3 See Address by Congressman John A. Bingham, Bowerstown, Ohio, August 24, 1866,
reprinted in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Aug. 27, 1866, at 1, col. 3:
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Although the Constitution and its amendments fail to provide a defi-
nition of the term "person," the express language of the amendment ap-
parently includes any human being."' A reading which excludes unborn
human beings seems to impose a modern problem which was never com-
templated by the framers of the fourteenth amendment. It simply was not
an issue in 1868.1 5 The legislative history of the amendment shows that
"human being" was synonymous with "person." Senator Jacob Howard,
the sponsor of the amendment on the Senate floor, saw the fourteenth
amendment as extending its protection to every living human being."'
[The amendment] imposes a limitation upon the States to correct their abuses of
power, which hitherto did not exist in your Constitution, and which is essential to the
nation's life. Look at that simple proposition. No State shall deny to any person, no
matter whence he comes, or how poor, how weak, how simple - how friendless - no
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. . . That proposition, I think, my fellow citizens needs no argument. No man
can look his fellow-man in the face surrounded by this clear light of heaven in which
we live and dare to utter the proposition that of right any State in the Union should
deny to any human being who behaves himself well the equal protection of the laws.
Paralysis ought to strangle the tongue before a man should be guilty of the blasphemy
that he himself to the exclusion of his fellow man, should enjoy the protection of the
laws.
Accord, remarks of Congressman John A. Bingham, House of Representatives, CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866): "If a State has not the right to deny equal protection to
every human being under the Constitution of this country in the rights of life, liberty, and
property, how can State rights be impaired by penal prohibitions of such denial as proposed?"
"I See Address by Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, Bedford, Pennsylvania, September 4,
1866, reprinted in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Sept. 11, 1866, at 2, cols. 1, 3:
That [Union] triumph brought with it difficulties even greater than the war itself.
To rebuild a shattered empire . . . and to erect thereon a superstructure of perfect
equality of every human being before the law; of impartial protection to everyone in
whose breast God had placed an immortal soul. . . . I shall not deny, but admit, that
a fundamental principle of the Republican creed is that every being possessing an
immortal soul is equal before the law.
Accord, remarks of Senator Jacob M. Howard (the floor sponsor of the fourteenth amendment
in the Senate), CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866):
The last two clauses of the first section . . . disable a state from depriving not merely
a citizen of the United States, but any person whoever he may be, of life, liberty or
property without due process of law [or of equal protection]. This abolishes all class
legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one class of
persons to a code not applicable to another. . . . It establishes equality before the law
and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the [human] race the
same rights and the same protection as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy,
or the most haughty.
Accord, remarks of Representative Edgar Cowan, House of Representatives, CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866):
So far as the courts and the administration of the laws concerned, I have supported
that every human being within their jurisdiction was in one sense of the word [i.e.,
the non-political sense] a citizen, that is a person entitled to protection . . ..
115 See Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 233 (1969).
", See note 114 supra.
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In support of Roe, it may be argued that at the time the fourteenth
amendment was added to the Constitution, there was no need for creating
a distinction between the born and the unborn because there was no con-
troversy on the subject. This contention, however, does not explain why
the Roe Court in fact espoused a legal standard of fourteenth amendment
personhood other than "live human being" but could not justify this dis-
tinction from the legislative history of the amendment itself. The
Court-and this is enough to damn the decision as a whole from a constitu-
tional perspective-has not come forward with specific evidence that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to exclude unborn children
from constitutional personhood. Such evidence is the very least that good
constitutional theory can be expected to provide in the face of imminent
extinction of a class of biological human beings. It is an undisputed fact
that every human fetus is an individual, a live human being, and a mem-
ber of the human race. The onus probandi is on he who would deny their
existence to plead and prove by explicit evidence that they are not persons
entitled to the protections of the fourteenth amendment.
The milieu in which the fourteenth amendment was enacted shows an
entirely different emphasis than what the Roe Court announced as the
prevalent view at that time. In 1859 Horatio R. Storer obtained unanimous
adoption by the Committee on Criminal Abortion of the AMA of a resolu-
tion condemning the act of abortion at every period of gestation except
when necessary to save the mother's life. The basis for that resolution was
the "unwarrantable destruction of human life.""' In 1867, the Medical
Society of New York condemned abortion at any stage of gestation as
"murder.""' In 1868, Francis Wharton argued the injustice of the quicken-
ing distinction in abortion statutes and argued that the unborn child
should be protected regardless of gestational age." 9 I., short, by the time
the fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868, twenty-six out of the
thirty-seven states had statutes which incriminated abortional acts prior
to quickening.'20 In the next 15 years, a total of seven more states incrimi-
nated pre-quickening abortional acts: Colorado (1876), Delaware (1883),
Georgia (1876), Minnesota (1873), Nebraska (1873), South Carolina (1883),
Tennessee (1883).
" AMA, Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 1859, reprinted in 10 THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
GAZErE 409 (1859).
"I Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-
1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 459 (1968).
"1 2 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRimiNAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 210-12 (6th ed.
1868).
"2 Alabama (1840-41), Arkansas, California (1849-50), Connecticut (1860), Florida (1868),
Illinois (1867), Indiana (1859), Iowa (1860), Louisiana (1856), Maine (1857), Maryland (1868),
Massachusetts (1845), Michigan (1846), Missouri (1855), New Hampshire (1848), New Jersey
(1849), New York (1845), North Carolina, Ohio (1841), Oregon (1864), Pennsylvania (1860),
Texas (1859), Vermont (1867), Virginia (1848), West Virginia (1863) (continuing prior Vir-
ginia laws), and Wisconsin (1858).
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There is nothing in the language itself of the amendment, in the var-
ious state statutes in force at the time of ratification, in the legislative
history of the amendment, in the reports of medical societies of the time
or in the general philosophy of the time to give the slightest scintilla of
evidence which rationally justifies relegation of any live human being,
regardless of its stage of fetal development, to constitutional nonperson-
hood. All the evidence that exists supports the opposite conclusion. Nei-
ther the Roe Court nor any other court,' moreover, which decided against
the legal personhood of the unborn child, has been able to produce a
specific, unequivocal statement in the text of the history of the fourteenth
amendment showing an intent to exclude the unborn. The burden rests on
them to prove that unborn children as a particular class of human beings
were by the intent of the framers beyond the pale of legal personhood. This
is elementary in constitutional law; 2 by framing the issue negatively, the
Court foreordained the outcome and revealed its objective to force a mean-
ing on a text for which there is not a scintilla of positive historical evidence.
When the existence of potential human life is at issue, the burden is upon
him who would deny it to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) either
it is not human life or, 2) if it is, that it is not protected by the fourteenth
amendment, by showing positive, specific evidence of such intent of the
framers of that amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made bad constitutional law in Roe v. Wade.
It is bad law not because of its social result, a matter of intensive debate
among all segments of American society, but because of its failure to de-
velop a sufficient analysis. The threshold question concerning the
humanity-personhood of the unborn was never confronted nor analytically
discussed and resolved with the result that the decision is doomed as an
un-principled constitutional doctrine.
"2 See, e.g., McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
22 The rule of liberal construction places the benefit of the doubt on the side of him whose
life or liberty is threatened under color of law by the state or its instrumentalities. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

